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Elementary particles appear in different ways. Particles of the same kind (similar
particles) share all state-independent properties like mass, charge, and spin quan-
tum number; there are many similar particles, but they are indistinguishable with
respect to a certain class of properties. However, the case might even be stronger:
similar particles apparently share all state-dependent properties, like spatial loca-
tion and spin projection. This threatens the validity of Leibniz’s famous Principle
of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII; see Rodriguez-Pereyra (2014) for a historical
reconstruction).
As it is usually understood, quantum mechanics requires for similar particles




|R〉1| ↑z〉1|L〉2| ↓z〉2 − |L〉1| ↓z〉1|R〉2| ↑z〉2
]
, (1)
with properties of spatial location L and R and spin properties ↑z and ↓z. Ac-
cording to the standard reading, both particles are in the same state, namely in





|R, ↑z〉〈↑z, R|+ |L, ↓z〉〈↓z, L|
)
. (2)
Philosophically, one hence concluded (as per the standard) that similar quantum
particles, regardless of their state, violate every interesting version of the PII;
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the quantum particles are utterly indistinguishable in every physically possible
situation, no matter how many such particles are being considered.
Since Saunders (2006), some authors have applied the discerning defence of the
PII in the following way: they argue that (at least for fermions) there is always an
overlooked physical relation that discerns the particles weakly. This relation is not
asymmetrical, as previously expected, but irreflexive, which is allegedly sufficient
to save the PII. In the case at hand, proponents of Weak Discernibility (WD)
would say that, although no particle has a definite spin projection property, both
particles are physically discerned by having opposite spin. Thus, until recently,
the state of the art was that the PII can either be saved by WD, or is lost.
Recently, however, Ghirardi et al. (2002) pointed out that one has to carefully
distinguish purely permutation invariant states, such as the above, from states











In this state, the properties of spatial location are no longer coupled with the
spin properties. In addition, one can now violate Bell-inequalities. Consequently,
the requirement of permutation invariance can be satisfied in different ways, with
robust physical consequences or without them. This distinction is the physical
grounds for a new iteration of the philosophical debate.
Firstly, the basic physical notions of permutation symmetry and entanglement
are newly under philosophical consideration. Then, secondly, some authors have
argued that a stronger version of the PII can be satisfied by similar quantum
particles, at least in purely permutation invariant states. For example, therein
there apparently is a particle located at R with spin-up and another particle
located at L with spin-down; two (not merely weakly) distinguishable particles
apparently emerge within such states.
Still, these distinguishable particles cannot be those that are labelled by the
tensor product indices “1” and “2”, since both particle 1 and particle 2—if there is
any such particle—would be in the same mixed state. Therefore, connected with
the new discerning defense of the PII, the so-called labelling problem arises (or
rather returns in a new way): what Caulton and Butterfield dubbed “factorism”,
i.e., the view that the tensor indices refer to physical particles, is under pressure.
This philosophy of language aspect is the second main issue of this special subject
matter.
In particular, the four papers address the following issues.
In his paper ‘How to justify the symmetrization postulate in quantum me-
chanics’, Tomasz Bigaj examines the question of how quantum mechanics justi-
fies the Symmetrisation Postulate—mainly with respect to many particle systems.
Furthermore, he addresses the issue of how to properly interpret labels that are
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present in the formal representation of the physical states of same-type particles.
The joint paper ‘Identical Quantum Particles as Distinguishable Objects’ by
Dennis Dieks and Andrea Lubberdink argues against the factorist approach. They
charge both the former standard view as well as the WD approach with tacitly
assumed indistinguishability of similar particles, and offer an alternative concep-
tion of quantum particles, which understands such particles as emergent, non-
fundamental, and always absolutely distinguishable based on their physically
grounded identity.
In ‘Leibniz, Kant, and Referring in the Quantum Domain’, Cord Friebe also
advocates an anti-factorist perspective. He presents two alternative strategies of
referring to similar particles: the Leibnizian strategy of referring with the help of
(newly introduced) descriptive proper names, and the Kantian strategy of referring
via intuition and demonstratives.
Lastly, F. A. Muller and Gijs Leegwater defend factorism against several anti-
factorist arguments in their paper ‘The Case against Factorism’. They show how
with the construction of ‘snapshot Hilbert space’ and ‘Schrödinger-movie’ the QM
formalism could offer labels that refer descriptively. In this way, similar particles
become absolutely discernible, even from a factorist perspective.
The special issue follows up on the international workshop Individuality, Dis-
tinguishability, and (Non-)Entanglement that took place at the University of Bonn
in March 2018. The invited lectures have been recorded and are available online.1
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